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Pennsylvania's Manufacturing Exemption to the
Capital Stock Tax, When Limited to Manufacturing
Within Pennsylvania, Violates the Commerce Clause:
PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - COMMERCE CLAUSE - CAPITAL STOCK TAX -
MANUFACTURING EXEMPTION - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that the Pennsylvania capital stock tax statute allows a corporation
operating in Pennsylvania to exempt only the value of capital stock
related to manufacturing within Pennsylvania from the computation
of its capital stock tax, and, under that interpretation, the
manufacturing exemption facially discriminates against interstate
commerce.
PPG Industries, Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. 87, 1999 Pa. LEXIS
1734 (Pa. June 17, 1999).
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania imposes a capital stock tax
on domestic entities and a franchise tax based upon the capital
stock of foreign entities that are located within the state.' Under
Pennsylvania law, foreign and domestic entities are given the
option to be taxed by either method.2
Each method exempts from taxation the portion of an entity's
1. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7602 (1990). A capital stock tax is a tax "assessed as a
percentage of par or assigned value of capital stock of a corporation." BLACK'S LAW
DIuTONARY 1458 (6th ed. 1990). A franchise tax is an "annual tax on the privilege of doing
business in a state; it is not a direct tax on income." Id. at 659.
2. See Commonwealth v. After Six, Inc., 413 A-2d 1017, 1023 (Pa. 1980). 72 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 7602(a), which applies the capital stock tax to domestic entities, provides that "any
domestic entity or company subject to the tax prescribed herein may elect to compute and
pay its tax under and in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) of this section,"
and 72 PA CONS. STAT. § 7602(b)(1), which applies the franchise tax to the capital stock of
foreign entities, provides that "any foreign corporation, joint-stock association, limited
partnership or company subject to the tax prescribed herein may elect to compute and pay
its tax under section 602 (a)." 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7602 (1990).
72 PA CONS. STAT. § 7601 defines a domestic entity as any "corporation having capital
stock . . . now or hereafter organized or incorporated by or under any laws of the
Commonwealth." 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7601 (1990). 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7601 defines a foreign
entity as any "corporation ... organized ... under the law of any other state or territory of
the United States, or by the United States, or ... under the law of any foreign government,
and doing business in and liable to taxation within the Commonwealth." Id.
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capital stock that is devoted to manufacturing within Pennsylvania.3
This feature is known as the "manufacturing exemption," and exists
in order to promote industry within the Commonwealth.4 The
amount of capital stock subject to tax for an entity that chooses to
be taxed as a foreign entity is determined by finding the
appropriate apportionment factor and then multiplying the
apportionment factor by the total amount of the entity's capital
stock to find the taxable value.5 The apportionment factor includes
a manufacturing exemption, and is identified by averaging three
ratios: payroll in Pennsylvania to total payroll, tangible property in
Pennsylvania to total tangible property, and sales in Pennsylvania
to total sales; the manufacturing exemption reduces tax liability
because it allows the subtraction from the Pennsylvania payroll,
property, and sales totals the portions of payroll, property, and
sales, respectively, that are attributable to the administration of
manufacturing within Pennsylvania.
6
PPG Industries, Inc., a manufacturer of glass, fiberglass, paint,
coatings, and chemicals, is headquartered in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania.7 In 1983, PPG chose to be taxed as a foreign
corporation for the purpose of the Pennsylvania capital stock tax.
8
In determining its apportionment factor, PPG exempted the value
3. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. 87, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *3 (Pa. June
17, 1999). 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7602(a), which applies to entities that choose to be taxed as
domestic entities, describes the manufacturing exemption as follows:
[T]he provisions of this section shall not apply to the taxation of the capital stock of
entities organized for manufacturing... within the State ... but every entity ... shall
pay the state tax . . . upon such proportion of its capital stock, if any, as may be
invested in any property or business not strictly incident or appurtenant to the
manufacturing . . . business, . . . it being the object of this provision to relieve from
State taxation . . . only so much of the capital stock as is invested purely in the
manufacturing ... business.
72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7602 (1990).
72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7602(b)(1), which applies to entities that choose to be taxed as foreign
entities, states that "the manufacturing ... exemptions contained under section 602(a) shall
also apply to foreign corporations." Id.
4. See PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *3, n.4 and *8.
5. See id. at *2.
6. See id. at *2-*3. The apportionment factor is determined as follows:
(Pennsylvania property - manufacturing exempt property) + total property = A
(Pennsylvania payroll - manufacturing exempt payroll) + total payroll = B
(Pennsylvania sales - manufacturing exempt sales) + total sales = C
(A+B+C) + 3 = apportionment factor.
Id. at *3.
7. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 832 (Pa Comnmw. Ct. 1996), rev'd,
No. 87, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, (Pa. June 17,1999).
8. See PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *2.
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of its payroll and property at its Pittsburgh headquarters devoted to
all of its manufacturing, instead of solely the amount directly
related to its manufacturing within PennsylvaniaY The result was
an apportionment factor of .027905 and a tax liability of $362,765.10
The Pennsylvania Board of Finance and Revenue ("Board") took
exception to PPG's manner of determining its apportionment
factor." After conducting an audit of PPG's 1983 tax return, the
Board determined that PPG had improperly included within the
manufacturing exemption the value of the payroll and property
located at PPG's headquarters that was devoted to administering
manufacturing operations outside of Pennsylvania.12 Consequently,
the Board concluded that the proper apportionment factor was
.047750, and the proper tax liability was $716,250.13
After the Board reviewed and affirmed its decision, PPG
appealed to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, and claimed
that the Board's decision was improper on statutory and
constitutional grounds. 14 In a panel opinion, the commonwealth
court concluded that the manufacturing exemption applied only to
manufacturing within Pennsylvania, and that there was no
constitutional violation under the Commerce Clause because no
item of interstate commerce that moved across state lines was
affected by the exemption as applied by the court. 5
9. See id. at *3-*4.
10. See id. at *3-*4. The ultimate tax liability was found by multiplying the
apportionment factor by the value of PPG's capital stock, which PPG determined was $1.3
billion, and then multiplying the product, $36,276,500, by the millage rate affixed by 72 PA.
STAT. § 7602(h), which was 10 mills for 1983. See id. A mill rate is a "tax applied to real
property. Each mill represents $1 of tax assessment per $1000 of property value assessment."
BLACK's LAw DICTONARY 994 (6th ed. 1990).
11. See PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *4.
12. See id.
13. See id. The Board of Finance and Revenue also found that PPG's determination of
the value of its capital stock was too low and adjusted it upward from $1.3 billion to $1.5
billion. See id. at *4, n.5. The recalculated apportionment factor, .047750, multiplied by the
recalculated value of the capital stock, $1.5 billion, resulted in a taxable value of $71,625,000
which, multiplied by the millage rate of 10, equaled the tax liability of $716,250. See id. at *4.
14. See id. at *5. "PPG argued that the Code granted the exemption to headquarters'
operations that concerned manufacturing generally, and that if it did not, the
Commonwealth's methodology violated the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution." Id. at *5. The Commerce Clause grants the power "to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes" to the national
legislature. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 3.
15. PPG Indus., Inc. V. Commonwealth, 681 A.2d 824, 829 (Pa. Conunw. Ct. 1995), aff'd
en banc, 681 A.2d 832 (Pa. Conuw. Ct. 1996). The panel of the court found no Commerce
Clause violation because "nothing moving in interstate commerce is measured or affected by
the exemption." Id. at 829. The panel consisted of Judges Samuel L. Rodgers, Dan Pellegrini,
2000
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After granting PPG's motion for en banc review of its initial
decision, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court once again
affirmed the findings of the Board.16  In holding that the
manufacturing exemption applied only to manufacturing within
Pennsylvania and that it was not a violation of the Commerce
Clause, the commonwealth court echoed the conclusions found in
the prior panel opinion. 7 Specifically, Judge Dan Pellegrini, who
had also authored the panel opinion, found that the words of the
Code relating to the manufacturing exemption clearly included only
in-state manufacturing, and that there was no Commerce Clause
violation because there was no prejudicial effect on any transaction
that crossed state lines as a result of only including in-state
manufacturing within the exemption."8
PPG appealed the commonwealth court's en banc decision to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.'9  PPG continued to attack the
and James R. Kelley. Id. at 824. A panel is a "group of judges (smaller than the entire court)
which decides a case." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1111 (6th ed. 1990).
16. PPG Indus., 681 A.2d at 835. En banc "[r]efers to a session where the entire
membership of the court will participate in the decision." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 526 (6th
ed. 1990). PPG hoped to achieve a more favorable ruling because, in the interim between
when the commonwealth court's panel decision was announced and its acceptance of PPG's
petition for en banc review, the United States Supreme Court delivered its decision in-Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996), finding a North Carolina intangibles tax a violation of
the Commerce Clause because the tax unconstitutionally discriminated against the
ownership of stock in foreign corporations. PPG Indus., 681 A.2d at 834. An intangible is
"[p]roperty that is a 'right' such as a patent, copyright, trademark, etc., or one which is
lacking physical existence; such as goodwill." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 809 (6th ed. 1990). An
intangibles tax is imposed in certain states "on every resident for the right to exercise the
following privileges: (a) Signing . .. and issuing intangibles; (b) selling . . . trading in and
enforcing intangibles; (c) receiving income, increase, issues and profits of intangibles; (d)
transmitting intangibles by will or gift or under state laws of descent; (e) having intangibles
separately classified for taxes." Id.
The en banc commonwealth court distinguished Faulkner from the dispute before it on
the basis that Pennsylvania's manufacturing exemption does not treat domestic and foreign
corporations differently because any corporation, whether domestic or foreign, may choose
to be taxed as either a domestic or a foreign entity. PPG Indus., 681 A.2d at 835.
17. See PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *6.
18. PPG Indus., 681 A.2d at 833, 835. Judge Bernard McGinley filed a dissenting
opinion, in which he criticized the majority for failing to find a commerce clause violation.
Id. at 836 (McGinley, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the Commerce Clause is
violated by the manufacturing exemption's treatment of out-of-state manufacturing because a
decision to expand manufacturing activity outside of Pennsylvania increases an entity's
Pennsylvania tax liability, while a decision to relocate manufacturing activity to Pennsylvania
would reduce an entity's Pennsylvania tax liability. Id. (McGinley, J., dissenting).
19. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa LEXIS 1734, at *6. Such an appeal of a commonwealth court
decision concerning a ruling of the Board of Finance and Revenue is a matter of right for
the appellant. Id. at *1 n.i. "Any final order of the Commonwealth Court entered in any
appeal from a decision of the Board of Finance and Revenue shall be appealable to the
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manufacturing exemption as applied by the Board on statutory and
constitutional grounds.20 By urging the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
to construe the language referring to the manufacturing exemption
broadly, PPG hoped to have the entire value of the payroll and
property at its Pittsburgh headquarters placed within the
exemption, as opposed to just the portion of it attributable to
manufacturing within Pennsylvania.21 In addition, PPG asserted that
if the statute was not given a broad interpretation as requested,
then the manufacturing exemption should be declared an
unconstitutional state regulation of interstate commerce.
22
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Stephen Zappala, summarily rejected the proposition that the
statute allowed the manufacturing exemption to apply to
out-of-state manufacturing as well as to that carried on in
Pennsylvania.23 The court referred to Gilbert Associates, Inc. v.
Commonwealth24 to establish that the manufacturing exemption
should have the same effect regardless of whether an entity
chooses to be taxed as a domestic or a foreign entity.25 Justice
Zappala then cited Commonwealth v. Weldon Pajamas, Inc.,2 6 in
which the court held that only manufacturing inside Pennsylvania
could be eligible for the manufacturing exemption, and gave it
decisive weight in rejecting PPG's claim that the manufacturing
exemption applied to the administration of out-of-state
manufacturing from its headquarters.27
After determining the scope of the manufacturing exemption, the
court focused upon whether such a scope violated the Commerce
Supreme Court, as of right, under this section." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 723 (b) (1981).
20. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *7, *9.
21. Id. at *7. "PPG essentially argues that so long as its Pennsylvania headquarters
conducts activities incident to manufacturing, such as budgeting, sales, engineering and
production planning, the actual manufacturing does not have to take place in the
Commonwealth." Id.
22. Id. at *9.
23. Id. at *8-*9.
24. 447 A.2d 944 (1982).
25. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa- LEXIS 1734, at *7. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Gilbert Associates concluded that "notwithstanding the uniform and equal tax rates, by
failing to provide an option to foreign corporations equivalent to that which has been
provided to domestic corporations . . . the Legislature has imposed unequal tax burdens
upon domestic and foreign corporations." Gilbert Assocs., 447 A-2d at 946-47.
26. 248 A.2d 204 (1968). In Weldon Pajamas, the court stated that "the taxpayer must
actually be engaged in manufacturing in Pennsylvania to qualify for the exemption." Id. at
207.
27. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *8.
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Clause.2" The basis of Justice Zappala's analysis of the Commerce
Clause was PPG's claim that the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully,2 Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Commission,30  and Fulton Corp. v.
FaulknerW 1 require that the manufacturing exemption be declared
unconstitutional if found to mandate treating in-state and
out-of-state manufacturing differently.32 The court concluded that
the Pennsylvania manufacturing exemption does violate the
Commerce Clause because it discriminates against out-of-state
commercial activity regardless of whether any item moving across
state lines is affected.3
Justice Zappala's determination that the manufacturing exemption
violates the Commerce Clause was made even though such a
28. Id. at *9.
29. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
30. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
31. 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
32. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *9, *16. Boston Stock Exchange arose out of
New York's decision to tax securities transferred in New York differently if the securities
were sold via a New York exchange than if they were sold on an exchange not in New York.
Id. at *10-*11. The transfer of securities within New York that were sold on a non-New York
exchange were taxed at a higher rate with no upper limit of taxation, while a New York sale
and transfer was subject to a lower rate with a maximum tax levy. Id. at *11. The United
States Supreme Court found that the tendency of the differential treatment to distort
economic decision-making constituted an unconstitutional interference with interstate
commerce. Id. at *12.
Another New York provision, which gave a tax credit to domestic international sales
corporations if they increased their exports from New York ports, generated the litigation
that resulted in the Supreme Court's decision in Westinghouse Electric. Id. A violation of the
Commerce Clause was once again found because such a tax incentive tended to distort
economic decision-maldng to the detriment of efficiency in order to achieve tax advantages.
Id. at *13. The Court found it important to point out that a free market between states for
pieces of interstate commerce exists, but does not extend to the discriminatory taxation of
out-of-state commercial activity. Id.
The Faulkner litigation was a result of a North Carolina tax on the fair market value of
shares of stock owned by North Carolina residents, which allowed a taxpayer to reduce his
tax liability by a percentage equal to the percentage of the issuing corporation's income
taxable in North Carolina. Id. at *15-*16. Because the tax effectively discouraged interstate
commerce by disadvantaging a corporation's attempt to raise capital within North Carolina to
the extent that the corporation conducted out-of-state commercial activities, the Supreme
Court declared that the North Carolina tax violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 16.
33. Id. at *18. The court specifically responded to the Commonwealth's argument that
there is no Commerce Clause violation if no transaction crosses state lines by remarking that
"[t]he application of Commerce Clause analysis is not limited to those cases involving a
'transaction or incident' that 'crosses state lines;' such cases are merely among the types of
cases which implicate the Commerce Clause." Id. at *18. The standard for determining if a
particular state provision is discriminatory is whether it treats in-state activity differently
than out-of-state activity to the advantage of the former. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., v. Dep't of
Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
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decision may have a chilling effect upon manufacturing within
Pennsylvania.3 The court decided that the discriminatory effect of
the exemption would lead to business decisions being made on the
basis of tax avoidance rather than economic efficiency, as well as
to a degree of "economic Balkanization" that the Commerce Clause
does not allow.35 Consequently, the decision of the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court was reversed, and the case was remanded to
the commonwealth court for a determination of whether the capital
stock tax, of which the manufacturing exemption is a part, could
be saved by being characterized as a compensatory tax.36 A
compensatory tax is one that serves a valid local purpose that
cannot be served in a nondiscriminatory manner.
37
The scope of the manufacturing exemption to the Pennsylvania
capital stock tax was disputed nearly from its inception s In 1915,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Williamsport
Rail Co. 39 was faced with the question of whether the exemption
applied to a manufacturing company that did not actually
manufacture anything within the state, but supplied raw materials
34. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *19, n.9. The court pointed out that it "is ever
mindful of the manufacturing exemption's long history and the potential chilling effect that
an ultimate decision holding the manufacturing exemption unconstitutional would have on
manufacturing in the Commonwealth." Id.
35. Id. at *19. The court stated that "[b]y employing the manufacturing exemption to
the capital stock tax as a means of inducing other business operations, i.e., manufacturing,
to be performed in Pennsylvania, Section 602 unconstitutionally forecloses 'tax neutral
decisions' and affords preferential treatment to corporations that engage in manufacturing
activities in the Commonwealth." Id.
36. Id. at *20. On remand, the commonwealth court refused to find the capital stock
and franchise tax to be a compensatory tax. Michael Race, Judge Asks Lawmakers to
Amend State Tax Law, PITrSBURGH POST-GAZETrE, Dec. 3, 1999, at B9. The commonwealth
court suggested that the manufacturing exemption either be expanded to include
manufacturing performed in all states, or be abolished, so that even Pennsylvania
manufacturing is not exempted. Id. Estimates concerning the effect of removing the
exemption entirely suggest that such action could result in a $600-700 million tax increase on
manufacturers within Pennsylvania. Id. Pennsylvania's legislature acted promptly to avoid
such a result by expanding the manufacturing exemption to include manufacturing in any
state. See H.R. 1848, 183 Leg., Regular Session. (Pa. 1999).
37. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa, LEXIS 1734, at *20. "[O]nce a determination has been made
that a statute is facially discriminatory, the burden then shifts to the state to establish that
the statute 'advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by
reasonably nondiscriminatory alternatives.'" Annenberg v. Commonwealth, No. 003 & 004,
1998 Pa. LEXIS 652, at *11 (Pa. April 7, 1998). This saving principle, that allows for an
otherwise unconstitutional provision to be upheld if such a legitimate local purpose is found,
was promulgated by the United States Supreme Court in New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 278 (1988).
38. See Commonwealth v. Williamsport Rail Co., 95 A. 795 (Pa. 1915).
39. 95 A. 795 (Pa. 1915).
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to a Pennsylvania company that transformed the raw materials into
steel rails.40 The court concluded that supplying raw materials to a
manufacturing concern is not equivalent to manufacturing.41
Therefore, the supplier of the raw materials was not given the
benefit of the manufacturing exemption, even though the steel rails
were the property of the supplier once the manufacturing process
was complete.
42
The limited scope of the manufacturing exemption was further
established and elucidated in 1968 in Commonwealth v. Weldon
Pajamas, Inc.4 In Weldon, a New York corporation, which supplied
cloth to its wholly-owned Pennsylvania subsidiary for the
manufacture of clothing products, attempted to exclude the value
of the raw material, work in process, and finished inventory at its
subsidiary from the numerator of the tangible property fraction in
determining its apportionment factor.M The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court found that the subsidiary may implement the manufacturing
exemption to exclude the value of its assets actually used in
manufacturing within Pennsylvania, but the parent benefits from no
such exclusion unless it actually engages in manufacturing within
the borders of Pennsylvania.
45
40. Williamsport Rail, 95 A. at 796. Williamsport Rail Company was incorporated for
manufacturing purposes in Delaware and registered for doing business in Pennsylvania. See
id. Because it had no factory in Pennsylvania, Williamsport Rail Company shipped its raw
materials to Sweets Steel Company, which transformed the raw materials into steel rails for
a fixed compensation. See id. The finished product, however, was the property of the
Williamsport Rail Company. See id.
41. Id. See United States v. Anderson, 45 F. Supp. 943, 949 (S.D. Cal. 1942) (finding that
a manufactured item could be nearly anything that man can make out of raw materials but
cannot be the raw materials themselves). See also C.P. Jhong, Annotation, What Constitutes
Manufacturing and Who is a Manufacturer Under Tax Laws, 17 A.L.R.3d 7, 20 (1968)
(explaining that manufacturing within tax statutes normally requires a substantial alteration
of the basic material).
42. Williamsport Rail, 95 A. at 796. The court declared that "buying raw material and
sending the same to a company owning a plant, and paying that company an agreed price to
shape the raw material into a manufactured product is not carrying on the business of
manufacturing within the State as contemplated by our laws." Id. See Commonwealth v.
Semet-Solvay Co., 105 A. 92, 93 (Pa. 1918) (finding that the manufacturing exemption
extends only to the value of the capital stock related to assets actually used in
manufacturing within Pennsylvania).
43. 248 A.2d 204 (Pa. 1968).
44. See Weldon Pajamas, 248 A.2d at 205.
45. Id. The court stated that "our analysis of the statute . . . convinces us that . . .
the Legislature intended the manufacturing exemption to apply only to those corporations
actually engaged in manufacturing in Pennsylvania." Id. One exception to the "actually
engaged in manufacturing" requirement was identified. Id. This exception has a very narrow
application, however; it applies only to corporations that are organized for manufacturing
purposes and own a factory within Pennsylvania that is rented to another corporation that
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State locational tax incentives designed to attract interstate
businesses, such as the Pennsylvania manufacturing exemption,
46
are neither indigenous to Pennsylvania nor are they a modern
creation. 47 As early as 1791, New Jersey offered tax advantages to
Alexander Hamilton to entice him to locate his factory in the
state.48 However, the proliferation of state locational tax incentives
for business in recent years is a unique feature in American
history.49 This proliferation has raised concerns that the country
may begin to suffer from "economic balkanization" as each state
competes against others to develop the most lucrative tax incentive
plans; claims that the commerce clause is violated by this
competition have arisen as well.50
actually engages in manufacturing at the plant. Id. at 205.
46. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. 87, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *8 (Pa.
June 17, 1999). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in PPG Indus. stated that the
"manufacturing exemption is a locational incentive that was created in order to establish a
favorable climate in Pennsylvania for manufacturers and thus encourage the development of
industry." PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *8. See Commonwealth v. Williamsport Rail
Co., 95 A. 795 (Pa. 1915) (identifying the purpose of the manufacturing exemption as the
encouragement of investment in capital and the development of manufacturing within
Pennsylvania).
47. See Mark Taylor, Note, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72
TEX L REV. 669, 671 (1994).
48. See KPMG Peat Marwick, Incentive Wars, Making a Good Deal Better, 95 STATE
TAX NoTEs 222-46 (Nov. 17, 1995) [hereinafter KPMG Survey].
49. See KPMG Survey, supra note 48. According to a 1995 survey by KPMG Peat
Marwick LLP, 79% of American companies surveyed receive some type of tax incentive. Id.
Some of the most common forms of tax incentives, in addition to the apportionment factor
reduction used by Pennsylvania, are investment tax credits (ITCs) and job-creation credits.
See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on
State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARv. L REv. 378, 384 (1996). An investment tax credit
is "legislation designed to stimulate investment by business in capital goods and equipment
by allowing a percentage of the purchase price as a credit against individual and corporate
taxes due and not merely as a deduction from taxable income." BLACK'S LAw DIcTIONARY 826
(6th ed. 1990). A job-creation credit allows a reduction in tax owed according to a "multiple
of a company's incremental in-state employment or payroll." Enrich, supra at 385. As of
1992, 37 states offered some form of investment tax credit, and 44 states offered some form
of job-creation credit in order to attract companies. See id. at 385 n.6.
50. See Enrich, supra note 49, at 381. A common complaint about locational tax
incentives is "not primarily that they favor intrastate commerce over interstate commerce,
but rather that they seek to channel interstate commerce disproportionately into a particular
state." Id. at 444 n.372. The economic efficacy to a particular state of attracting a company
through tax incentives is debatable; one could argue that the real gain is not an economic
one at all but, rather, a political one for the incumbent legislators of the offering state. Id. at
396. The spoils to a "victorious" state may, in fact, be economically deleterious considering
the tax revenues that are foregone by offering the tax incentive - for example, Michigan
identified $4.9 billion in tax expenditures (i.e., lost revenues due to tax incentives) on
commerce for the 1996-1997 fiscal year. Id. at 388. From a national perspective, a contrary
argument can be made that competition between states, with the weapon of choice being tax
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This concern about the potential effects of competition between
the states for commercial benefits is not a new feature of political
debate in America."' In fact, the Commerce Clause was designed as
a means of avoiding interstate commercial rivalries by granting the
authority to regulate interstate commerce to the national
government instead of allowing it to reside in the several states.52
It was not long before Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce was challenged by state action.5 In 1824, the United
States Supreme Court was asked to resolve a controversy arising
from New York's grant of an exclusive right to navigate the waters
of the State of New York with boats powered by fire or steam to
Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton in Gibbons v. Ogden.- This
exclusive grant precluded anyone else from using fire or steam to
navigate such waters, including anyone coming from neighboring
states into New York waters, even if one possessed a permit under
an Act of Congress to engage in such a trade.
55
Chief Justice John Marshall, writing for the Court, framed the
issue as one concerning whether the states retained a concurrent
power to regulate interstate commerce along with the national
incentives, "is actually a healthy process that drives down the level of state taxation of
mobile capital to its economically optimal level." Id. at 401.
51. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 283 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(referring to the discord generated from the lack of a national power to regulate interstate
commerce within the Articles of Confederation and the necessity of granting such a power in
any new plan of government).
52. See THE FEDERAIusT No. 7, at 40 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
Alexander Hamilton perceived the potential for rivalries to develop between competing
states as a particularly nefarious possibility if a national power to regulate interstate
commerce was left out of the Constitution. THE FEDERALIST No. 7, at 40. He described the
potential imbroglio as follows:
We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in reality the
justifiable acts of independent sovereignties consulting a distinct interest. The spirit of
enterprise, which characterises the commercial part of America, has left no occasion
of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit
would pay much respect to those regulations of trade, by which particular states
might endeavour to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of
these regulations on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel them on the other,
would naturally lead to outrages, and these to reprisals and wars.
Id.
53. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
54. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1-2.
55. Id. at 2. Gibbons owned two steamboats that he used to travel between
Elizabethtown, New Jersey, and New York; he was duly licensed to use his steamboats in
such a manner by a 1793 Act of Congress entitled "An act for enrolling and licensing ships
and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same."
Id.
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government. 56 Concluding that the states retained no such power
because to hold otherwise would be to assume that the framers of
the Constitution intended for confusion to abound within the
Union, the Chief Justice declared that only Congress had the power
to regulate interstate commerce, while the states continued to hold
the authority to manage their intrastate commercial affairs.57 What
exactly constituted interstate commerce, a question to which Chief
Justice Marshall gave no definitive answer, continued to generate
disagreement for years to come.
58
The nature of the relationship between the power of the national
government and that of the states as animated by Congress's
authority to regulate interstate commerce was once again explained
by Chief Justice Marshall in the 1829 decision of Willson v. Black
Bird Creek Marsh Co.59 The controversy in Willson arose from the
erection of a dam on navigable waters pursuant to an act of the
Delaware legislature; a subsequent challenge to the act was based
upon the claim that Delaware was attempting to regulate interstate
commerce.6 0 Because Delaware was attempting to protect the
health of its citizens by authorizing the construction of the dam
and there existed no contrary national law concerning the
waterway, no violation of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce was found.61 Chief Justice Marshall's holding, however,
56. Id. at 8.
57. Id. at 13-15. Chief Justice Marshall remarked, "We do not find, in the history of the
formation and adoption of the Constitution, that any man speaks of a general concurrent
power, in the regulation of foreign and domestic trade, as still residing in the states." Id. at
13. The barrage on the notion that a concurrent power to regulate interstate commerce
remained with the states also included a remark by the Chief Justice that such a situation
was "insidious and dangerous" because it contained no inherent limits; a state could
potentially fill in the gaps left by national legislation and, in effect, frustrate the national
purpose sought to be accomplished. Id. at 17-19.
58. See generally United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (finding that
manufacturing is not commerce); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (holding
that the process of buying and selling meat at a stockyard can be considered interstate
commerce even if the animals are at rest within the stockyard if such a process has a direct
effect on activities outside of a particular state); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (finding that interstate commerce has come to an end once an
animal has been delivered to a slaughterhouse wherein it will be butchered); Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (concluding that coal extraction is not an activity of interstate
commerce).
59. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
60. See Wilson, 27 U.S. at 245. The decision of the owners of a sloop to ram through
the dam in order to continue on through the marsh was the origin of the controversy. See id.
at 245. An action of trespass was brought against the operators of the sloop; consequently,
the authority of the state to license such a project was challenged. See id. at 246.
61. Id. at 250. The Court placed great weight upon the purposes to be served by the
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cannot be seen as a robust limitation on national power because of
his reference to Congress's "power to regulate commerce in its
dormant state"; that is, the Commerce Clause was found to
proscribe state legislation when Congress's inaction is seen as an
approval of the status quo.62
The Court further refined the limits upon state involvement in
areas touching upon interstate commerce in 1851 in Cooley v.
Board of Wardens.3 At issue was a Pennsylvania law that required
ships to hire pilots to aid in navigating through certain waters
bordering upon Pennsylvania.M The Cooley Court held that the law
constituted a regulation of interstate commerce; nevertheless, the
Court upheld the legislation because the nature of the subject
regulated permitted state participation.65  More specifically,
navigation through local waters was found to demand the diverse
regulation that states may provide, as opposed to the uniform
regulation that Congress is capable of delivering.
66
The body of law detailing the restrictions placed upon a state's
power to regulate certain subjects affecting interstate commerce
was given another significant addition in the 1937 case of
Henneford v. Silas Mason Co.6 7 After considering whether a
Washington statute placing a two percent use tax on items bought
outside of Washington and used within the state violated the
Commerce Clause, the Henneford Court concluded that such a tax
passed constitutional scrutiny because it merely compensated for a
two percent sales tax that was affixed to items purchased within
act and the lack of a contrary national law: "The value of the property on its banks must be
enhanced . . . and the health of the inhabitants probably improved. Measures calculated to
produce these objects, provided they do not come into collision with the powers of the
general government, are undoubtedly within those which are reserved to the states." Id.
62. Id. at 252. See, e.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (declaring that
states may regulate some local subjects with effects upon interstate commerce until
Congress acts, but subjects which are national in nature or require uniform legislation must
remain free of state interference).
63. 53 U.S. 299 (1851).
64. See Cooley, 53 U.S. at 311-12. Failure to acquire the services of a satisfactory pilot
resulted in a fine payable to the master warden for the benefit of the Society for Relief of
Distressed and Decayed Pilots, their Widows, and Children. See id.
65. Id. at 319.
66. Id. The majority opinion quite clearly explains that the states may continue to
regulate the subject until Congress acts to deprive them of such authority because "it is
likely to be the best provided for, not by one system, or plan of regulations, but by as many
as the legislative discretion of the several states should deem applicable to the local
peculiarities of the ports within their limits." Id.
67. 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
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Washington. 68 Thus, a state regulation that touched upon interstate
commerce was, nevertheless, upheld because it was deemed a
compensatory tax, which placed an identical tax burden on in-state
and out-of-state goods.
6 9
In 1963 in Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily,70 the
Court resolved a dispute concerning a Louisiana sales/use tax
scheme similar to the one at issue in Henneford.7' The genesis of
the controversy was the application of the sales/use tax provisions
to an oil well servicing company doing business in Louisiana with
equipment assembled by the company in Oklahoma and also with
equipment purchased outside of Louisiana from entities that were
not regularly engaged in the business of selling such equipment.
72
The taxpayer objected to Louisiana's requirement that the taxpayer
include in calculations for the use tax the value of labor and shop
overhead relating to the equipment assembled outside of Louisiana
and the value of the items acquired through the isolated sales even
though no such requirements would have been imposed if the
activities would have occurred within Louisiana..73 Chief Justice Earl
68. Henneford, 300 U.S. at 588. Those subject to the two percent use tax were not
exposed to potentially higher amounts of taxation than purchasers of in-state goods because
the statute exempted anyone who had already paid a sales or use tax on an item in question
equal to or greater than the tax imposed by Washington from the reach of the provision; if a
sales or use tax that was already paid was less than two percent of the purchase price, then
the owner was liable to Washington for the difference. Id. at 580-81.
69. Id. at 584. Justice Benjamin Cardozo, writing for the Court, explained the effect of
the statute in his customarily colorful way: "When the account is made up, the stranger from
afar is subject to no greater burdens as a consequence of ownership than the dweller within
the gates." Id. Justice Cardozo distinguished this case from Baldwin v. G. A. F Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511 (1935), wherein a New York provision preventing milk from being sold in New
York if it was purchased out-of-state for less than the purchase price allowed within New
York was found to violate the Commerce Clause, by highlighting the New York statute's
effect of injecting its legislation into other states. Id. at 585. The Washington use tax was
identified not as an attempt to project legislation to other states, but merely as a means of
compensating for the unfavorable condition imposed upon sellers of goods within
Washington by the state sales tax. Id. at 581.
70. 373 U.S. 64 (1963).
71. Haliburton, 373 U.S. at 65. The Louisiana tax provisions imposed a two percent
sales tax on the value of items purchased within the state and a two percent use tax on the
value of items purchased out-of-state but used within Louisiana; the use tax was reduced by
the amount of any sales or use tax already paid on an item in a different state. See id. at
65-66.
72. Id. at 66-68.
73. See id. at 67. The fact that the value of labor and shop overhead would not have
been included in the taxable value had the equipment been assembled within Louisiana was
stipulated by the parties. See id. Louisiana also did not contest the assertion that the isolated
sales (i.e., the purchase of a well cementing unit from a Texas company and the acquisition
of an airplane from a New York company) would not have been taxed had they been
conducted with a Louisiana concern (n.b., an isolated sale is one made by an entity that is
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Warren, writing for the Court, found such inequitable treatment to
be an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce
because it would pressure companies to locate within Louisiana in
order to avoid the unfavorable treatment of out-of-state activity.
7 4
Following the Hatliburton decision, the Court was faced with an
increased number of disputes concerning state tax provisions that
resembled locational tax incentives, such as that giving rise in 1977
to Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Commission.75 New York's
decision to tax transfers of securities within New York differently
depending upon whether the sale occurred on a New York
exchange or an out-of-state exchange triggered the litigation in
Boston Stock Exchange.76 The challenged New York provision
actually discriminated in favor of out-of-state residents as long as
the sale of securities occurred within New York because it gave
such out-of-state residents a fifty percent reduction in the rate of
tax while granting no preferential tax treatment to in-state residents
regardless of where the sale took place. 77 In holding that the tax
not regularly engaged in the business of selling such items). See id. at 68.
74. Id. at 72-73. Chief Justice Warren found this tendency to funnel companies into
Louisiana from other states to be an especially pernicious attribute of the taxing scheme
because of the potential for the "multiplication of preferential trade areas" that would be
"destructive of the very purpose of the Commerce Clause." Id. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951) (striking down a Wisconsin law requiring milk pasteurization plants
to locate within five miles of the city of Madison because it impermissibly burdened
interstate commerce).
Even though Chief Justice Warren's acerbic comments concerning the constitutionality of
tax provisions that encourage business relocation are now over 36 years old, very few frontal
assaults (direct attacks on the laws solely because of their nature as locational tax
incentives) on such state laws have been made. Enrich, supra note 48, at 407-08. The reason
for this lack of challenges to such provisions has been attributed to a "lack of interest"
because of "the fact that the parties who are ordinarily in a position to bring challenges to
state business taxes, namely business taxpayers, have not found it in their interests to attack
this particular class of state tax policies." Id. at 408. But see R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
City of New York Dep't of Fin., 643 N.Y.S.2d 865. (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (agreeing with a
company doing business both within New York and without that the allowance of
accelerated depreciation deductions only for in-state investment unconstitutionally
discriminates against interstate commerce); Beatrice Cheese, Inc. v. Wisconsin Dep't of
Revenue, Nos. 91--100 to -102, 1993 Wisc. Tax LEXIS 5, at *6, *10 (Wis. Tax App. Comm'n
Feb. 24, 1993) (agreeing with a business carrying on commercial activities both inside and
outside Wisconsin that Wisconsin's tax statute is unconstitutional because it only allows
accelerated depreciation deductions for property located within the state).
75. 429 U.S. 318 (1977).
76. See Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 323-25. The motivation for the New York tax
structure concerning securities transfers was the belief that the development of out-of-state
exchanges, which detrimentally impacted upon the prosperity of New York exchanges, was
caused by the securities transfer tax that was absent from many other state tax statutes. See
id. at 323-24.
77. See id. at 324-25. Out-of-state residents who sold their securities on an out-of-state
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provision violated the Commerce Clause, the Court expressly
rejected the notion that there is no violation if the tax funnels
business into a state instead of protecting in-state business from
out-of-state competition.78
In 1977, the law concerning the constitutionality of state tax
provisions touching upon interstate commerce was clarified in
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady79 as the Court described a
four-part test to determine whether a state tax violated the
Commerce Clause.80 The case arose out of the application of a
Mississippi tax on the privilege of conducting business within the
state to a motor carrier operating within Mississippi.81 The motor
carrier claimed that the tax violated the Commerce Clause because
the items transported were articles of interstate commerce and,
therefore, the tax burdened interstate commerce.82 In rejecting this
argument, Justice Harold Blackrnun delineated the four-part test to
be applied to state tax provisions to judge their consonance with
the Commerce Clause: a tax must have a substantial nexus with the
taxing state, it must be fairly apportioned, it must not discriminate
exchange, like in-state residents, did not receive the benefit of the reduced tax rate. See id.
The tax provision also discriminated against interstate commerce by providing a cap to any
potential tax liability arising from a single transfer of securities if the sale was made on a
New York exchange regardless of whether an in-state or an out-of-state resident was
involved; no such cap existed if the sale occurred outside of a New York exchange. See id.
at 324.
78. Id. at 334. The Court's opinion considered the possibility that the New York tax
could be saved if it could be characterized as a compensatory tax for a burden imposed on
sales within New York. Id. at 331. In finding that the tax did not qualify as a compensatory
tax, the Court concluded that "[r]ather than 'compensating' New York for a supposed
competitive disadvantage resulting from § 270, the amendment forecloses tax-neutral
decisions and creates both an advantage for the exchanges in New York and a discriminatory
burden on commerce to its sister States." Id.
79. 430 U.S. 274 (1977). Prior to this decision, the Court had not developed a clearly
defined test for lower courts to consistently follow in state tax provision cases. See
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1959)
(describing the "case-by-case" approach that produced a "quagmire" out of the body of law
concerning state tax disputes).
80. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
81. See id. at 274-75. The motor carrier was a Michigan corporation that hauled
vehicles, which were shipped into Mississippi by rail, from points within Mississippi to
dealers within Mississippi. See id. at 276. The tax in question was essentially a sales tax
based upon the gross proceeds from doing business within Mississippi. See id. at 275-76.
82. See id. at 288-89. The Court concluded that none of the four prongs were violated,
and affirmed the proposition that interstate commerce is not immune from state taxation. Id.
at 287-88. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1938)
(declaring that an interstate business is not immune from state taxation merely because it
engages in interstate commerce because it still must assume its portion of the state tax
burden).
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against interstate commerce, and it must be fairly related to
services provided by the state in order to pass constitutional
scrutiny.83
The constitutionality of a state tax that encouraged the location
of business within a state was once again considered by the
Supreme Court in 1984 in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. TuUy.84
New York's decision to grant a tax credit to reduce the tax liability
arising from the operation of a domestic international sales
corporation ("DISC") to the extent that the DISC conducted its
export activity out of a New York port was objected to on
Commerce Clause grounds.85 Of particular concern to the Court
was the feature of the tax credit that caused it to decrease as
export activity from ports outside of New York increased.86 Thus,
not only did the tax credit serve to encourage business location
within New York, but it also served to discourage out-of-state
commercial activity regardless of the amount conducted within
New York.87 Justice Harold Blackmun, speaking for the Court,
struck down the tax credit provision on a basis similar to that
found in Boston Stock Exchange by objecting to the tendency of
the credit to prevent tax-neutral decisions by enticing companies to
locate within New York solely to gain favorable tax treatment to
the detriment of other states.
88
The 1988 New Energy Co. v. Limbach 9 decision is important
because within it the Supreme Court expressly referred to the
possibility that a state tax provision that violates the Commerce
Clause may, nevertheless, be upheld if the state can establish that
it serves a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately
served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives. 90 This saving
83. Complete Auto Transit, 430 U.S. at 279.
84. 466 U.S. 388 (1984).
85. See Westinghouse Elec., 466 U.S. at 395-96. The motivation for the credit was
supplied by a budget analysis that revealed that if DISC's were not taxed the state could lose
up to $30 million in revenue, but that such taxation would likely result in the formation of
DISC's outside of New York and a decrease in the amount of exportable goods produced
within the state. See id. at 392. A DISC is "[a] U.S. corporation . . . whose income is
primarily attributable to exports. Income tax on a certain percentage of a DISC's income is
usually deferred resulting, generally, in a lower overall corporate tax." BLACK'S LAW
DIcTIoNARY 484 (6th ed. 1990).
86. Westinghouse Elec., 466 U.S. at 401 n.9.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 405-06. The Court identified the general purpose of the Commerce Clause as
the creation of "an area of free trade among the several states" and remarked that such tax
incentives for business relocation impinged upon this purpose. Id. at 402.
89. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
90. New Energy Co., 486 U.S. at 278.
Vol. 38:973
PPG Industries v. Commonwealth
principle arose from a dispute concerning an Ohio tax credit that
was allowed to reduce the sales tax liability of fuel dealers relating
to sales of ethanol, but only if the ethanol was produced in Ohio or
in a state that gave similar tax treatment to sales of Ohio-produced
ethanol.91  The Court's opinion summarily identified the
discriminatory nature of the tax credit that burdened interstate
commerce, and, subsequently, found that no satisfactory argument
had been advanced that would .allow it to stand through the saving
principle.
92
In 1994 in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of
Environmental Quality,93  the Court considered whether an
otherwise impermissible compensatory tax could be upheld under
the saving principle identified in New Energy Co.94 The provision at
issue in Oregon Waste Systems was a surcharge resembling a
compensatory tax on out-of-state waste disposed of within Oregon
based upon the cost to the state of disposing of such waste.95
Because the fee paid for the disposal of in-state waste was less
than that charged for the disposal of out-of-state waste, the
surcharge was found to discriminate against interstate commerce.
96
The Court held that such a tax, even though discriminatory, could
be upheld not because of an isolated compensatory tax doctrine,
but because a compensatory tax can, at times, serve a legitimate
local purpose that cannot be served by reasonable
nondiscriminatory alternatives.97 In finding that the Oregon tax
must be struck down, the Court listed the necessary features of a
compensatory tax argument capable of withstanding the strict
scrutiny of Commerce Clause analysis: an identification of the
91. See id. at 271.
92. Id. at 274, 280. Specifically, Justice Antonin Scalla's majority opinion stated that
"[tihe Ohio provision at issue here explicitly deprives certain products of generally available
beneficial tax treatment because they are made in certain other States, and thus on its face
appears to violate the cardinal requirement of nondiscrimination." Id. at 274. In response to
the attempt to justify the credit as a device to improve health because the use of ethanol
reduces harmful auto emissions, Justice Scalia wrote that the "health . . . justifications
amount to no more than implausible speculation, which does not suffice to validate this
plain discrimination against products of out-of-state manufacture." Id. at 280.
93. 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
94. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 102-03.
95. See id. at 95-96.
96. See id. at 100. The surcharge on out-of-state waste amounted to $2.25 per ton,
while the fee imposed for the disposal of in-state waste was $0.85 per ton. See id. at 96.
97. Id. at 102. Specifically, the Court stated that although "our cases sometimes discuss
the concept of the compensatory tax as if it were a doctrine unto itself, it is merely a
specific way of justifying a facially discriminatory tax as achieving a legitimate local purpose
that cannot be achieved through nondiscriminatory means." Id.
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intrastate tax burden being compensated for, a showing that the
amount of the interstate tax imposed is close to but does not
exceed the intrastate tax being compensated for, and a showing
that the taxable events are substantially equivalent.
98
In 1996, in Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner,9 the Supreme Court
implemented the New Energy Co. and Oregon Waste Systems
principles in striking down a North Carolina tax that encouraged
investment in companies by North ,Carolina residents to the extent
that the companies did business within North Carolina.1°° Justice
David Souter's majority opinion identified the North Carolina tax as
discriminatory because it helped companies doing business in
North Carolina raise capital from North Carolina. residents, while
hindering such efforts of those conducting large amounts of their
business out-of-state. 10' As one may have expected in the wake of
Oregon Waste Systems, North Carolina attempted to justify the
provision as a compensatory tax for the cost of maintaining its
capital markets which businesses escape to the extent that they
engage in business outside of North Carolina.0 2 The Court rejected
this argument and, consequently, struck down the tax on
Commerce Clause grounds because the tax failed to meet any of
the three Oregon Waste Systems requirements. 0 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's determination in PPG
Industries that the manufacturing exemption to the Pennsylvania
capital stock tax facially discriminates against interstate commerce
because it only applies to in-state manufacturing is consistent with
an accurate reading of the statute and of Commerce Clause law.
98. Id. at 103. The Court found the fact that the interstate tax imposed was much
greater than the intrastate burden being compensated for as being particularly decisive in
striking down the tax. Id. at 104.
99. 516 U.S. 325 (1996).
100. Fulton Corp., 516 U.S. at 327-28. North Carolina residents were allowed a
reduction in the rate of tax imposed upon the value of the stock that they owned to the
extent that the companies issuing the stock did business in North Carolina. See id. The
extent to which a company did business in North Carolina was determined by analyzing the
fraction of its income subject to tax in North Carolina. See id. at 328.
101. Id. at 333. Justice Souter refused to acknowledge the possibility of a de minimis
defense to a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce. Id. at 333, n.3. "De
minimis" is short for "de minimis non curat lex," which means "[tihe law does not care for,
or take notice of, very small or trifling matters." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 431 (6th ed. 1990).
102. Id. at 334-35.
103. Id. at 336-39. Specifically, concerning the Oregon Waste Systems test, the Court
found that the connection between the intrastate burden and the out-of-state benefit enjoyed
by avoiding it was too speculative; that the burden of demonstrating that the interstate tax
imposed was not greater than the intrastate tax being compensated for was not carried; and
that the taxable events were not substantial equivalents. Id.
Vol. 38:973
PPG Industries v. Commonwealth
The scant amount of discussion within the court's opinion devoted
to whether the exemption pertains to out-of-state manufacturing is
warranted considering the relatively clear message that has
emanated from the court's holdings on the subject since the
inception of the exemption. 1 4 In fact, the relatively one-sided
treatment of the issue suggests that PPG's decision to controvert
the scope of the exemption may have been based upon the premise
that the court would rule differently in this instance, not because
of any likelihood that the statute, on its face, would be interpreted
differently, but because of the concomitant constitutional
challenge. 10 5 Because PPG attempted to retract its constitutional
challenge once it became apparent that it may be successful, it is
reasonable to conclude that it was merely used as a means of
goading the court into deviating from the past interpretations of the
scope of the exemption.
10 6
Regardless of PPG's motivation for bringing the constitutional
challenge, the court correctly concluded that the allowance of the
exemption only for in-state manufacturing facially discriminates
against interstate commerce. This conclusion is certainly bolstered
by the overall effect of the exemption, which not only encourages
the expansion of manufacturing activity within the state but also
hinders the development of such activity in other states.10 7 This
dual effect invades two interests that are traditionally protected by
the Commerce Clause and that serve as the underlying basis for
many of the previously discussed Supreme Court decisions - the
preservation of political unity (avoiding economic balkanization)
and the promotion of economic efficiency (allowing for tax-neutral
decisions). 08
Difficult cases may arise, however, when these two protected
104. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Commonwealth, No. 87, 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *7-*10 (Pa.
June 17, 1999).
105. Such a strategy is consistent with the understanding that courts will generally
interpret a statute so that it is constitutional if such an interpretation is reasonable.
106. PPG Indus., 1999 Pa. LEXIS 1734, at *21, n.10. The court remarked that
"[cluriously, ... PPG 'emphasizes that it has never sought to have the ... exemption itself
declared unconstitutional.' We find this assertion disingenuous. PPG, throughout these
proceedings, has challenged the manufacturing exemption on constitutional grounds ...
PPG cannot now, at this advanced stage of the proceedings, retract its constitutional attack."
Id.
107. Id. at *15.
108. See Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (objecting
to a state tax because of its tendency to divide the nation into various preferential trade
areas); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388, 406 (1984) (rejecting a state tax
provision because it prevents tax-neutral decisions).
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interests collide with another interest that is taken account of
when judging the constitutionality of locational tax incentives - the
protection of a state's freedom to compete for pieces of interstate
commerce.10 9 Cases involving provisions that favor one state by
discriminating against others do not present the difficult
determinations that are posed by potential disputes that may arise
when states choose to encourage commercial activity simply by
giving the same favorable treatment to both in-state and out-of-state
activity. For example, if Pennsylvania's manufacturing exemption
actually did apply to in-state and out-of-state manufacturing, an
argument could be made that it would encourage economic
balkanization and prevent tax-neutral decisions, yet it would seem
to comply with the notion that free competition does not
discriminate against interstate commerce.
If forced to choose between the competing interests, it is quite
possible that Commerce Clause law will be interpreted to favor the
interests of political unity and economic efficiency at the expense
of free competition for interstate commerce. Although it would be
difficult to classify locational tax incentives that do not recognize
state boundaries as discriminatory, 110 it is conceivable that courts
will find that such provisions violate the Commerce Clause in some
way in order to avert an increase in interstate bidding wars for'
commercial activity.11' This temptation should be resisted, however,
because the Commerce Clause does not remove a state's power to
raise revenue to satisfy its own needs as long as its tax provisions
do not discriminate against interstate commerce. 1" 2 Ultimately, such
non-discriminatory tax measures should withstand Commerce
Clause scrutiny because the existence of in-state voting taxpayers
109. This interest in allowing states to freely compete for interstate commerce has
been repeatedly proclaimed in numerous Commerce Clause cases by quoting the Supreme
Court in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.: "[Tihe very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to
create an area of free trade among the several States." McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S.
327, 330 (1944).
110. The operative definition of "discrimination" for Commerce Clause questions was
identified in Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S.
93, 99 (1994), as "differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter." It is difficult to conclude that a provision that
makes no distinction between two entities (e.g., between one state and another) somehow
discriminates against one in favor of the other.
111. See Enrich, supra note 49, at 380-81 (urging courts to strike down locational tax
incentives because they are unproductive but provided anyway because states cannot
remove themselves from the contest while other states continue to participate).
112. This position was recognized in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 199
(1824), within which the Court stated that the Commerce Clause does not remove the
"power of the States to tax for the support of their own governments."
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would prevent extreme locational tax incentive plans from being
passed while the preservation of free competition for interstate
commerce would compel states to keep the taxation of commercial
activity at its economically optimal level.
113
Craig HaUer
113. The presence of in-state interests opposed to the abuse of a certain power by the
legislature is a safeguard that has often been relied upon in determining if a particular
provision violates the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 473 n.17 (1980); West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 200 (1994).
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